Marx Weber

MARX WEBER





BY

MIGUEL RUBIALES PÉREZ

Undergraduate student, University of Vermont, 2005





ANALYTICAL ESSAY

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of

the course “Anthropological theory” 225

in University of Vermont at Burlington, 2005



Outline page (summary of contents and pages):

I Introduction

A Thesis: Marx’s and Weber’s theories have strong overlaps despite their forced, and some times based on deceits, differences.

B Authors’ Contexts: Author’s theoretical and political contexts.



II Theoretical contents’ similarities and logical arguments:

A. They share similar ideas about how to analyze and explain contemporary society and its origin. (“Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism”).

A.1 Differences.

A.2 Similarities.

A.3 Deceit (non sequitor fallacy).

B. They share similar ideas about social structure and class conflict. (“Economy and Society” and the “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”).

B.1 Strong rhetoric

B.2 Strong similarities

C. The have very different ideas about science (“The Politic and the Scientist” and “The Poverty of Philosophy”).

III Conclusion: Similarities of content and differences of position made both paradigms different but translatable and give a key to understand general discussions about theory.



Marx & Weber, the Marxists lapse, or Struggling about “Marx Weber’s” theory:

This analytical essay compares the main features of Marx’s and Weber’s theories. The influence of Marx’s work in Weber’s papers is so substantial that, despite the general assumption and Weber’s stress in their formal differences, it is very easy to translate ideas from one to the other… easy to the point that their work is understandable as unified in one shared paradigm with one set of concepts and two sets of terms. Their view of social structure, classes’ conflict and how to explain society from those tolls are very similar. Sometimes their affinity of contents is hard to see when hidden by rhetorical exaggeration of differences. In spite of the constant utilization of Marxist ideas, Weber often scorned Marxism. Weber also worked on a battery of critics against it that were more consistently developed by latter schools, like functionalism1.

Since they shared similar intellectual approaches to similar problems, Weber had strong political conflicts with Marxist movements and with Marx as a symbol. On the other hand, we can’t know what Marx could have thought about Weber. However, since Weber was in an equivalent position with Hegel, we can suppose than Marx would had a similar reaction to both: some kind of intellectual respect and a lot of sharp criticism. The two contextual keys of the author are their position in the science field and their political commitments (linked but not exactly the same):



1. First, Weber was “in the center of scientific field”, it means that he had a strong position as “state scientist” with privileges, honors, payments… while Marx was one “outsider” (in the whole meaning of the word). He never achieved academic privileges and faced the penalties of exile and poverty. Both biographical situations are personal results of their work: part of Marx exile is due to the corrosive political consequences of his theory; part of Weber’s rewards is due to his work to stop and decrease Marxist influence in the Germany academia (and to offer a valid re-elaboration of Marx insights to think about conflict and class). In fact, they both represent the two more opposed social roles of scientists and promote opposite possibilities of the praxis of social science.



2. Second, as a revolutionary activist, Marx was internationalist (he promoted the First International), very critical with Caesarism, and rejected imperialism. As a politician, Weber had structural conflicts with Marxist movements due to his nationalism, promoted German imperialism abroad, and Caesarism in German democracy (linked with it are his ideas about charismatic leaders, or the inclusion of 48th point in to post 1WG German’s constitution. This point was included to prevent a communist revolution, but was the article that allowed Hitler to achieve dictatorship powers)2.



But the best way to valuate their similarities and differences is through a close reading of Weber’s works. His most celebrated book, “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” (”PESC” from now) was the work that consecrated him into the academic world and is his more read and quoted one. The “PESC” is one attempt to show the flaws of Marxist explanation of the capitalist society’s origin. But despite this objective, Weber can’t avoid to sketch a research program about this question that seems very Marxist.

The “PESC” explores, formally, the underestimated influence of cultural and religious contents. As Weber wrote: “As far as the influence of the puritan outlook extended, under all circumstances –and this is, of course, much more important than the mere encouragement of capital accumulation- it favored the development of a rational bourgeois economic life;” (Weber, 1958, page 174). In the book, Weber argues that the protestant ascetic is the more important condition of possibility for the development of capitalism. The combination of “Breuf” (the “calling” with mixed religious and professional connotations); and the “accreditation doctrine” (material achievement as a signal of had being selected for the paradise) builds basic moral attitudes (ethics and behavior) that allow to achieve and maintain capitalist accumulation. For businessmen, this ascetic outlook made their activities acceptable, promoted an austere way of living (half of the requirements for accumulation), stresses the importance of productive work (the other half of accumulative activities) and, finally, gave a reason for the mere accumulation of money. For workers, this ascetic increased their discipline and moved their salary standards from the traditional ones (working until earn enough for the basic necessities) to the rational ones (working more for higher salaries and less for lower salaries). But those effects weren’t intentional: “They were not the founders of societies for ethical culture nor the proponents of humanitarian projects for social reform or cultural ideals. The salvation of the soul and that alone was the centre of their life and work. Their ethical ideals and the practical results of their doctrines were all based on that alone, and were the consequences of purely religious motives”. (Weber, 1958, page 90)

During the entire book, Weber claims the interrelation between economic and religious factors in the origin of capitalism and argues how they have mutual influences. Even more: Weber drives a whole program of research about those mutual interactions, but since he develops all the influences from religion to economy, all the influences from economy factors to the protestant reform are systematically ignored3. In the subtex of those economy factor, we can find the vivid influence of Marxism: The “saints” operated in a conflictive political context that influenced their theological contents: “And after the conflict with the Fanatics and the peasant disturbances, the objective historical order of things in which the individual have been placed by Good becomes for Luther more and more a direct manifestation of divine will.”4 (Weber, 1958, page 85) Even more, the Protestant Reform where based in a social class: the little bourgeoisie: “The rising middle and small citizens, from which entrepreneurs were principally recruited, were for the most part here and elsewhere typical representatives both of capitalistic ethics and of Calvinistic religion.” (Weber, 1958, chapter 1, in quote number 23). A Marxist analysis for understand Calvinism is sketched here: the influence of geographical areas and social groups in the rise of Calvinism (Weber 1958, pages 36 and 85), the “sanctification” –legitimating- of bourgeoisies’ practices, the attack of the way of living and of nobility rooted in Calvinism (Weber 1958, page 177, and chapter V), and the scorn that Calvinism holds towards the peasants (Weber 1958, page 161).

I think Weber refuses to explore the concrete interactions between economy factors and religious ones because by doing it he would refute his own main political thesis: “To be sure the capitalistic form of an enterprise form of an enterprise and the spirit in which it is run generally stand in some sort of adequate relationship to each other, but not in one of necessary interdependence.” (Weber, 1958, page 64). Well, to know if the theology contents where dependent of the economy factors or both had one relationship of adequacy is necessary to explore both interactions, not only one. The “PESC” hides a deceit (the “non sequitor” fallacy) in its basic structure: The evidences about the economical causation are accurately enumerated but they are not discussed (and not refuted at all). Despite the non refuted counterarguments that he sketched, Weber concludes against the stronger influence of economy factors. But the discussion about the adequacy and / or dependence between society and economical factors is faced further, in latest Weber’s works.

“Economy and Society” brings a similar critique of Marxist ideas, but finally addresses the exploration of how the relationships between the sphere of economy and the society are. The combination of intellectual admiration and political rivalry results in the same weird behavior than in the previous analyzed book: hidden quoting Marx and blaming him at the same time.

The way Weber portrays Marxism in “Economy and Society” is not the most adequate. He never quotes Marx’s name, and he never shows any link between the many ideas shared by both. In the few times that Weber refers to Marx, the redaction or some words imply scorn “by no mean”, “pseudoscientific”…

“Above all that, this fact must not lead to that kind of pseudo-scientific operation with the concepts of “class” and “class interests” so frequently found these days and which has found its most classic expression in the statement of a talented author, that the individual may be in error concerning his interest but that the “class” is “infallible” about his interest” (Mcgee and Warms, 1996, page 119)

Weak differences: In spite of the rhetorical rejection, a close analysis can show that their differences about social structure and class action are very small. In fact weber uses Marxist ideas very often.

a) The three spheres. For Weber, the social stratification is about general power5 differences embodied in three spheres: political, social and economical. This way of understanding societal stratification is, for many sociologists, an overcoming of Marx’s way to understand society (more complex, rich…). In fact, Weber stresses the economical sphere like the most meaningful or “determinant in last instance” (or like Weber would say “in the long run” (Mcgee and Warms, 1996, page 121)). Let’s get a closer rereading: For Weber, parties are not a source of social stratification, even if the politic is a toll to achieve or distribute power: “In any individual case, parties may represent interests determined through “class situation” or “status situation,” and they may recruit their following respectively from the other. […] They may represent ephemeral or enduring structures […] Parties also differ according to whether or not the community is stratified by status or by classes.” (Mcgee and Warms, 1996, page 127) Also, the interactions between class stratification and status stratification are very intense and dominated by the prevalent economy sphere: “When the bases of the acquisition and distribution of goods are stable, stratification by status is favored. Every technological repercussion and economic transformation threatens stratification by status and pushes the class situation into the fore ground” (Mcgee and Warms, 1996, page 126)6

Not only do Weber’s views of stratification stress the economy more that usually is assumed, but also Marx’s applied works uses more factors than just the materialist “last instance” determination. For example, in the entire article about Napoleon III’s coup D’état, a myriad of classes, subclasses, parties, factions in the army… are part of the explanation as well as the political context and the symbolic capital are used in order to analyzed what happened. One example: one political action leaded to the waist of the symbolic capital linked to National Guard “They had not, to be sure, borne their arms, but had worn their uniforms against the army; precisely in this uniform, however, lay the talisman. The army convinced itself that this uniform was a piece of woolen cloth like any other. The spell was broken.” (Marx 1852, chapter 3). The whole article is a good example of how Marx’s applied analysis to concrete situations is multifactorial and contingent).

b) The economical sphere. Weber had two criteria in order to define class and “class situation”: one was the monopoly of propriety and other was the market position (advantages and / or kind of good able to offer in the market)7. This second criteria is the key one and is linked with “the monopoly of direction of production”. The control or absence of control of production establishes which kind of good someone can or can’t exchange in the market. The “direction of production” or “the position in to labor market” are “translations” of the Marxist “control of means of production”. For Weber, the class’ struggle shifted from credit market, toward commodity market and to labor market. But for Marx, the class struggle shifted from slavery toward servitude and exploitation. Their different analyses of history trend (toward liberation or toward bureaucratic jails and charismatic leaders) don’t impeach to see the outstanding similarities in both writers among how the class stratification and contemporary society work.

c) From class to action. “The rise of societal or even of communal action from a common class situation is by no mean a universal phenomenon” (Mcgee and Warms, 1996, page 118) 8. The key word in this sentence is universal. Societal and communal actions rise from the class situation, but not always because some conditions must be reached. In order to know which conditions must be reached and how often class situation would lead to societal action, we have to keep reading, and we discover that: “The fact of being conditioned and the results of the class situation must be distinctly recognizable. Only for then the contrast of life chances can be felt not as an absolutely given fact to be accepted, but as a resultant from either (1) the given distribution of property, or (2) the structure of the concrete economy order. Is only then that the people may react against the class structure not only through acts of an intermittent and irrational protest, but in the form of rational association.” (Mcgee and Warms, 1996, page 118) So, some kind of action against class structure must be expected always, but for societal9 action it is necessary to realize that the life chances result from the wealth distribution and the economy organization. How hard it is to become aware of this link between economy system and life opportunities? Let’s ask Weber again: “Is the most elemental economic fact that the way in which the disposition over material property is distributed among a plurality of people, meeting in the market for the purpose of exchange, in itself creates specific live chances.” (Mcgee and Warms, 1996, page 116) The interpretation of how easy is to realize the most elementary economic fact is open. I would suggest that is easy enough to expect that people affected by them can recognize it10.

The actual and substantial difference between those two authors is found in their political points, their idea of science and their desires of what science should be, and scientist should do. Those positions about what science should be keep influencing the debate in our days. Our discussions about what we “like” or “dislike”, the ups and dawns of the anthropological theory authors are shaped and aimed by the differences in those two ways of understand science. Weber though that a good scientist takes scientific knowledge as one goal in it self. This is why he called it “vocation” (linked with the religious “calling” and the material accumulation as a goal in it self). His position is clear in his conference “Science as Vocation”: “The task of the teacher is to serve the students with his knowledge and scientific experience and not to imprint upon them his personal political views… whenever the person of science introduces his personal value judgment, a full understanding of the facts ceases.” Or “Science today is a 'vocation' organized in special disciplines in the service of self-clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts.” (Weber, Science as vocation, electronic resource); on the other hand, Marx (the first postmodern11) understood science as a committeemen with people, a way to improve society and a toll of activism. The end of “The poverty of philosophy” where Marx quotes George Sand always had impressed me:

“It is only in an order of things in which there are no more classes and class antagonisms that social evolutions will cease to be political revolutions. Till then, on the eve of every general reshuffling of society, the last word of social science will always be:

“Combat or Death: bloody struggle or extinction. It is thus that the question is inexorably put.”” (Marx, 1846, last sentence)

As I have tried to show here, the differences of content between Marx and Weber are very small. Their differences about substantial issues are reduced to the little nuance “often, but no necessarily” or “not always”. But, at the same time, their differences seem to be very strong. And, in some way, they are. Their ideas about how science should be, about society, and about the trend of history are very sharp. But if we assume Marx and Weber don’t share the same paradigm, then our vision of what a paradigm is not based on substantial contents but in the way of using science. I thing both criteria operate simultaneously in the way we thing schools of though and on paradigms. If so, Weber and Marx have separated but perfectly translatable ones.







Bibliography

Galvan, Jose L. Writing Literature Reviews. California: Pyrczak Publishing, 1999.

McGee and Warms. Anthropological Theory. California: Mayfield Publishing, 1996.

Marx, Karl:

The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 1852. electronic resource in http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/, Nov, 15, 2005

The Poverty of Philosophy, 1846. Electronic resource in http://www.marxists.org/archive/ marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/ch02e.htm , Nov, 15, 2005.

Weber, Max.

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.

Science as vocation, conference, electronic resource in http://www.ne.jp/asahi/moriyuki/ abukuma/weber/lecture/science_frame.html, nov, 15, 2005.

Wikipedia.org, entries for Marx Weber and Karl Marx.

Zeitlin, Irving M. (1968). Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.